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Transparency at Home: How Well Do
Governments Share Human Rights Information
with Citizens?
cosette creamer and beth a. simmons*
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, an increasing number of States have adopted
access-to-information laws or other institutions designed to make avail-
able information about government decisions and activities.
1 An u m b e r
of factors have made possible this trend toward greater governmental
transparency. The spread of democratic government worldwide, the
emergence of a global civil society, the proliferation of international
regimes requiring States to disclose information, and the widespread
availability of information and communication technologies have all
likely contributed to the global transparency trend.
2 Underlying these
pressures is a strong belief that transparency inﬂuences, among other
things, the quality and efﬁciency of governance.
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to our knowledge about
the role of transparency in safeguarding and improving human rights, as
* Alexander Noonan and Ashley DiSilvestro provided invaluable research assistance. We
also beneﬁted from discussions of an earlier version of this chapter at the authors’ retreat
for ‘Transparency in International Law’ and at the International Law-International
Relations Workshop at Harvard University. All errors remain ours alone.
1 John M. Ackerman/Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of
Information Laws’, Administrative Law Review 58 (2006), 85–130.
2 There is no commonly agreed upon deﬁnition of transparency. Some scholars and
international organizations employ a deﬁnition that focuses on ensuring public access
to information. For Ann Florini, transparency refers to the ‘degree to which information
is available to outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to
assess the decisions made by insiders’. Ann Florini, ‘Introduction: The Battle Over
Transparency’,i nA n nF l o r i n i( e d . ) ,The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 1–16, 5. Others employ deﬁnitions
that reference, in addition, the scope, accuracy and timeliness of information provided.
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oneelementofgovernance.We deﬁnetransparencyasthedissemination
of regular and useful information.
3 Many studies assume that informa-
tion about government policies and practices helps improve compliance
with international and domestic human rights law,
4 but they have not
documentedhowandtowhatextentinformation-enhancinginstitutions
andpracticeshavebeenensconcedattheinternationalandespeciallythe
domestic levels. We argue that one critical window into this matter is the
establishmentofnationalhumanrightsinstitutions(NHRIs).NHRIsare
independent governmental bodies speciﬁcally mandated to protect and
promote human rights, and represent focal institutions for the provision
of transparency about rights law and practice at the national level. We
argue that the efﬁcaciousness of these institutions depends on how and
whether they actually inform people about the nature of human rights
law and how individuals can act on this knowledge if they think their
rightshavebeenviolated.Nowadays,websitesrepresentthemaintoolby
which NHRIs inform citizens of these matters. We show that NHRI
websites are now commonplace, but recognize they are only potentially
useful if they work, are navigable, and provide information that citizens
can use to hold their governments and private actors accountable.
Not all NHRI websites rate highly in this regard and display consid-
erable differences in the quality and quantity of information provided.
We ﬁnd that internet penetration within a country is a very strong
predictor of a useful and user-friendly NHRI human rights website.
Unsurprisingly, however, it is impossible to attribute better rights prac-
tices to this ‘window’ per se. Internet penetration itself is strongly
associated with better rightspractices across countries. We think it likely
that NHRIs contribute in a small way to transparency in the human
rights domain, but that their effects cannot be disentangled from the
transparency effects of the internet more generally.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the second section, we discuss
theories of compliance with international human rights obligations, and
the potential role of transparency in encouraging improved human
rights practices. The third section discusses the role of NHRIs in mon-
itoring, promoting, and educating people about their rights. We show
3 Ronald B. Mitchell, ‘Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes’, International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998), 109–130, 109.
4 Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International
Law in Domestic Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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they have spread over time, that most now have websites, and that many
of these websites are operable and in fact do contain information about
local and international law in a form comprehensible to laypersons. The
fourth section employs statistical anal y s e st oa s s e s st h ec o n d i t i o n sa s s o -
ciated with the existence of highly transparent websites, and the ﬁfth
section explores correlations between these sites and human rights
practices.Wearefarfromprovidingacausalmodellinkingtransparency
with better human rights, but note that both internet penetration and
more transparent NHRI websites are associated with better rights prac-
tices in countries around the world. While we think it highly likely that
governments that respect human rights are more willing to be more
transparentabouttheirhumanrights obligations,practicesandavailable
remedies, we also conclude that a better window on government practi-
ces may reinforce positive developments by enhancing the ability of
individuals and groups to stay informed and hold governments and
o t h e ra c t o r sa c c o u n t a b l ef o rt h e i ra c t i o n s .
2. Transparency and Human Rights: The State of the Art
In the context of human rights, transparency refers to the provision and
accessibility of information about: (a) the speciﬁc human rights guaran-
teed, both internationally and nationally, to citizens, and what these
rights mean in practice; (b) the procedures and legal processes available
to ensure realization of their rights; and (c) a government’s policies and
practices of human rights protection.
5 U n d e rt h i sd e ﬁnition, human
rights transparency is viewed not as an end in itself but as an instrument
for improving States’ human rights practices. The consumers of this
information are both citizens affected by a government’sh u m a nr i g h t s
practices, and international treaty bodies and NGOs tasked with mon-
itoring these practices.
Transparency is often cited as the solution to a host of development
and governance problems. The claimed beneﬁts of greater transparency
are many: it can improve investment climates and ﬁnancial market
performance more generally; it can promote public debate and improve
policy-making; and it can increase the ability of legislatures, the media
and civil society to hold policy-makers accountable, thereby increasing
5 Thesearesimilartotheelementsoftransparencyidentiﬁedby Abraham Chayes/Antonia
Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 135–153.
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public trust and conﬁdence in government. There are thus a number of
theoretical reasons to expect greater transparency to improve States’
compliance with human rights obligations, as transparency is often
viewed as contributing to increased accountability of governments to
both international and domestic actors. More speciﬁcally, most theories
of compliance with international law rely explicitly or implicitly on
the availability of information about government activities and legal
obligations.
Still, international human rights treaties do not establish a legal
obligationonStatestobetransparentabouttheirhumanrightspractices.
None of the nine major human rights treaties, or their optional proto-
cols, mention transparency in relation to States.
6 The only use of the
word ‘transparent’ isfound within article35(4)oftheConvention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which provides that ‘[w]hen prepar-
ingreports to theCommittee, StatesPartiesareinvited toconsiderdoing
soinanopenandtransparentprocess’.
7Inparticular,States‘shallclosely
consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including
children with disabilities, through their representative organizations’.
8
In contrast, the Convention against Torture explicitly provides for the
absence of transparency, in the form of conﬁdential inquiries under
article 20 into the systematic practice of torture within a country.
9 In
terms of dissemination of information about human rights, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child is the only treaty to provide
that State parties are to ‘undertake to make the principles and provisions
of the Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means, to
adults and children alike’.
10
6 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13;
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195; Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3; UNGA, Resolution Adopted by the
General Assembly: International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance, A/RES/61/177, 12 January 2007, annex; International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 93; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
7 Convention on the Rights of Persons with D i s a b i l i t i e s ,2 0 0 6( n6 ) ,a r t .3 5 ( 4 ) .
8 Ibid., art. 4(3).
9 C o n v e n t i o na g a i n s tT o r t u r e ,1 9 8 4( n6 ) ,a r t .2 0 .
10 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (n 6), art. 42.
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Much of the early human rights scholarship implicitly viewed trans-
parency at the international level as a key mechanism to encourage
compliance with human rights obligations. By ratifying international
human rights treaties, States became legally obligated to be open about
their human rights practices as well as their efforts to implement treaty
obligations. Every major human rights convention establishes an inde-
pendent oversight committee to which States are required to submit
periodic reports on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other
measures adopted to give effect to human rights obligations. Most
human rights conventions, though, do not require States to otherwise
disseminate these periodic reports. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families are exceptions,
as they provide that ‘S t a t e sP a r t i e ss h a l lm a k et h e i rr e p o r t sw i d e l y
available to the public in their own countries’.
11 After considering
periodic State reports, each committee then typically provides conclud-
ing observations and often requests additional information. Each com-
mittee is also permitted to transmit its concluding observations and the
State reports themselves to other relevant international agencies.
12
Through these periodic reports, governments are required to provide
information to the treaty committees on their human rights practices and
efforts tocomply. IfStatesfall shortin thisregard, the committee–through
its concluding observations – often publicly identiﬁes non-compliant
States, thereby engaging in a practice of ‘naming and shaming’–that is
publicizing a country’s human rights violations and calling for reform.
Similarly, the Human Rights Council (as previously the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights) provides an international forum in which
other governments (as opposed to independent treaty bodies) ‘name and
shame’ through yearly resolutions. Within these resolutions, individual
countries are singled out and publicly criticized for failing to uphold
international human rights standards.
13 This strategy of ‘naming and
shaming’ perpetrators of human rights abuses is often employed by
NGOs and the news media as well. Theoretically, this strategy is
believed to negatively affect a State’s reputation for ‘good behavior’
11 Ibid., art. 44(6); Migrant Workers Convention, 1990 (n 6), art. 73(4).
12 S e e ,f o re x a m p l e ,C o n v e n t i o no nt h eR i g h ts of the Child, 1989 (n 6), art. 45(b).
13 James Lebovic/Erik Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country
Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR’, International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006),
861–888.
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internationally
14 or increase social pressures to comply with human rights
treaties.
15 However, its effectiveness in improving compliance is question-
able. For example, Emilie Hafner-Burton found that global ‘naming and
shaming’ is often followed by a continuation of or increase in some human
rights violations, even as other types of violations (typically those most
visible) are reduced.
16
Justastransparencyandhumanrightsappeartobemutuallyreinforc-
ing at the international level, at the domestic level they seem to go hand
in hand as synergetic means to promote democratic consolidation,
development and good governance generally. And in fact, over the past
three decades, the adoption of access-to-information laws has increased
dramatically,
17 matched if not surpassed by the proliferation of human
rights legislation and institutions.
18 Most domestic theories of compli-
ance with international law also rely on the availability of information
about government activities and legal obligations. For example, Beth
Simmons argues that knowledge that one’s government is publicly
committed to comply with an international human rights treaty raises
the expectations of domestic groups that they can legitimately demand
compliance with such treaties.
19 Xinyuan Dai hypothesizes that infor-
mation producedby international bodies can informdomestic audiences
about the activities of their governments, and inform judgments about
whether a government has complied with its international legal obliga-
tions. This information allows domestic constituencies to apply electoral
pressure to their government in order to hold them accountable to
the law.
20
W er e c o g n i z et h a tt h e r ea r ean u m b e ro fw a y st om e a s u r eh u m a n
rightstransparency,bothdomesticallyandinternationally.Nevertheless,
14 Robert Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’, Harvard
International Law Journal 38 (1997), 487–502; Andrew Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law’, California Law Review 90 (2002), 1823–1887.
15 Thomas Risse/Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in Thomas Risse/Stephen Ropp/
K a t h r y nS i k k i n k n( e d s . ) ,The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and
Domestic Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38, 15; Ryan
Goodman/Derek Jinks, ‘How to Inﬂuence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law’, Duke Law Journal 54 (2004), 621–703.
16 Emilie Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights
Enforcement Problem’, International Organization 62 (2008), 689–716.
17 Ackerman/Sandoval-Ballesteros, ‘Freedom of Information Laws’ 2006 (n 1).
18 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4), 57–64.
19 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4).
20 Dai, International Institutions and National Policies 2007 (n 4).
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the ultimate goal of international human rights treaties is and should be
human rights transparency to a State’s population, so that citizens
themselves may be provided with the means to further their own
human rights. While transparency to international organizations or
treaty bodies may be important in encouraging compliance, this chapter
focuses on the provision of human rights information to a State’sp o p -
ulation. A number of institutions may be responsible for providing such
information, but this responsibilityi n c r e a s i n g l yh a sf a l l e nt oN H R I s ,
which we argue have the potential to contribute signiﬁcantly to trans-
parency regarding human rights law, policies, practices and remedies.
Our empirical focus in this chapter is therefore on the diffusion of these
institutions around the world, as well as their potential to shed light on
these policies to a broad audience, both at home and abroad.
3. The Role of NHRIs in Human Rights Compliance
A ‘national human rights institution’ refers broadly to ‘a body which is
established by a government under the constitution, or by law or decree,
the functions of which are speciﬁcally designed in terms of the promo-
tion and protection of human rights’.
21 Originating in western European
and Commonwealth countries, NHRIs spread throughout southern
Europe, Latin America, central and eastern Europe during the 1980s
and 1990s. More recently, these institutional forms have proliferated
throughout Asia and the Middle East. According to our estimates, 144
countries have established some type of a national human rights insti-
tution (see Figure 10.1).
22
The term ‘national human rights institution’ encompasses a range of
governmental bodies with human rights mandates, and in fact there is
still considerable debate over the deﬁnition of an NHRI.
23 The three
primary ‘models’ of an NHRI are the classical ombudsman model; the
21 UN, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and
Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights ( N e wY o r k :U n i t e dN a t i o n s ,1 9 9 5 ) ,6 .
22 These estimates are based on lists of NHRIs found within existing scholarship or
provided by the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs. In addition, for
each of the 199 countries we examined, we independently conducted extensive web
searches for any mention of an NHRI not included within the above lists.
23 Ryan Goodman/Thomas Pegram, ‘National Human Rights Institutions, State
Conformity, and Social Change’, in Ryan Goodman/Thomas Pegram (eds.), Human
Rights, State Compliance and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights
Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–28, 6–11.
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national human rights commission model; and a hybrid model. The
ombudsman model consists of a single member (the ombudsman) and
staff, with a mandate typically covering procedural irregularities in
public administration, ethnic and gender discrimination and children’s
rights. The national human rights commission model is a multi-member
institution with a broad mandate to monitor and promotehuman rights,
and in some countries includes the authority to investigative individual
complaints. Lastly, the hybrid model, often in the form of a Human
Rights Ombudsman Ofﬁce, combines aspects of the ombudsman and
commission models and deals with both human rights and public
administration.
24
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Figure 10.1 Number of National Human Rights Institutes World-wide by Region
24 Jeong-Woo Koo/Francisco O. Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global Human
Rights: Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966–2004’,
Social Forces 87 (2009), 1321–1354; International Council on Human Rights Policy,
Performance and Legitimacy: National Human Rights Institutions (Versoix:
International Council for Human Rights Policy, 2nd edn, 2004); but see Leonard F.M.
Besselink, ‘Types of National Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights and
Ombudsman Institutions: An Overview of Legal and Institutional Issues’, in Kamal
Hossain et al. (eds.), Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsman Ofﬁces (London:
Kluwer Law International, 2001), 157–165.
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SeriousinternationalcooperationregardingNHRIsreallybeganinthe
1990s, with the adoption of the Paris Principles by a group of NHRIs in
1991. The Paris Principles establish general international standards on
the mandate and structure of NHRIs, and were later endorsed by the UN
Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the
UN General Assembly.
25 In 1994, NHRIs established their own network
in the form of the International Coordinating Committee of National
Human Rights Institutions, charged with organizing and overseeing all
international and regional connections. The International Coordinating
Committee and the OHCHR have provided some deﬁnitional conver-
g e n c eb ye s t a b l i s h i n ga na c c r e d i t a tion process for NHRIs, based on the
institution’s compliance with the Paris Principles.
26 Although States are
oftenencouragedtoestablishanNHRI,therecurrentlyexistsnointerna-
tional legal obligation for them to do so.
According to the Paris Principles, NHRIs are government-initiated
andﬁnancedinstitutionsthataresupposedtoremainindependentofthe
government and other actors. While all are ostensibly designed to pro-
mote human rights, NHRIs display considerable variation in their ofﬁ-
cialfunctions.Thesefunctionstypicallyinclude:reviewingproposedand
existing legislation for compliance with ‘fundamental principles of
human rights’;
27 monitoring international treaty implementation; pro-
ducing reports on a government’s human rights practices; providing
training and research opportunities to various governmental and non-
governmental actors; and assisting with individual complaints.
Not all NHRIs have explicit jurisdiction over international human
rights, particularly within countries that have historically enjoyed strong
domestic protections or that prefer domestic to international mecha-
nisms. Yet even for those that do not have an explicit international
mandate,NHRIsareoftentaskedwithhelpingtoensureimplementation
of and compliance with the human rights conventions a State has
ratiﬁed.Infact,theUNencouragestheestablishmentofNHRIsprecisely
because these institutions are believed to provide a central mechanism
25 UNGA, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
A/RES/48/134, 20 December 1993, annex: Principles Relating to the Status of National
Institutions (Paris Principles).
26 The Paris Principles include, inter alia: operation independent from government;
membership that broadly reﬂects societal composition; incorporation into legislation;
and cooperation with civil society. For a description of the accreditation procedure, see:
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Pages/default.aspx.
27 U N G A ,P a r i sP r i n c i p l e s ,1 9 9 3( n2 5 ) ,a r t .3 ( i ) .
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throughwhichinternationalhumanrightsnormscanbeimplementedat
the domestic level.
28 They are viewed as providing the ‘practical link
between international standards and their concrete application’
29 and
have even been permitted to participate in relevant meetings of the UN
Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.
30
One way in which NHRIs contribute to the implementation of inter-
national human rights is by inﬂuencing the content of domestic human
rights legislation, itself often inspired by ratiﬁcation of international
human rights conventions.
31 T h em a j o r i t yo fN H R I sa r em a n d a t e dt o
advise governments on the compatibility of proposed or existing legis-
lation with international standards. In addition, NHRIs often apply
international human rights standards in their monitoring activities,
particularly in the drafting of annual reports and in their handling of
individual complaints and cases. They are also increasingly viewed as
important sources of information regarding States’ periodic reports
submitted to international treaty bodies, and many even submit their
own ‘shadow reports’ to these bodies.
The promotion and education function of NHRIs is perhaps most
relevant to a government’s human rights transparency. The educational
work of NHRIs covers a broad range of activities, such as public educa-
tion on human rights, public awareness campaigns, media work, and
trainingStateofﬁcialsaboutthehumanrightsstandardswithwhichthey
must comply. This public education and awareness function is funda-
mentally about communicating to the public in simple terms what
human rights are and what mechanisms are available to protect them.
It also entails publicizingthestepsa country hastaken to implement and
28 UNGA, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights:
Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/320, 24 August 2009; UNGA, The Role of the
Ombudsman, Mediator and Other National Human Rights Institutions in the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/63/169, 20 March 2009; UNGA,
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, A/RES/63/
172, 20 March 2009; Goodman/Pegram, ‘National Human Rights Institutions’ 2012 (n
23), 16–18.
29 UN, Economic and Social Council, Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and
Methods of Work of the Commission: National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights: Report of the Secretary General Submitted in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/50, E/CN.4/1997/41, 5 February
1997.
30 Julie A. Mertus, Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights
Institutions (Stanford University Press, 2009), 8.
31 Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights 2009 (n 4).
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comply with international human rights obligations. In this way NHRIs
remain a central locus for transparency regarding government human
rights practices, although many NHRIs face signiﬁcant challenges in
making their services accessible to as many people as possible.
A growing body of scholarship has sought to identify the conditions
facilitating the transnational spread of NHRIs. A number of studies ﬁnd
that international institutions – speciﬁcally the OHCHR and UN treaty
bodies – play an important role in persuading government actors to
establish NHRIs.
32 Global and regional NHRI networks have also been
identiﬁed as signiﬁcant actors in explaining the particular form of an
NHRI.
33 Apart from these inﬂuential actors, cross-national studies have
found some evidence supporting a world polity explanation, according
to which countries that are ‘more embedded’ in ‘world culture’ are more
likely to create an NHRI.
34 A State’s membership in international gov-
ernmental and NGOs, the number of international human rights con-
ventions it has ratiﬁed, and the regional and global density of NHRIs
have all been found to help explain the decision to set up this institution.
Predictably, democratic countries with few human rights violations are
more likely to create an NHRI, though an increasing number of ‘partly
free’ and ‘not free’ countries are setting up these institutions as well.
Income, based on World Bank Gross Domestic Product per capita
categories, on the other hand, does not seem to be correlated with
NHRI creation.
35
4. NHRI Transparency
The formal establishment of an NHRI does not in and of itself guarantee
that this institution will provide information or enhance knowledge
about a country’s human rights practices and processes. Yet as one of
32 Sonia Cardenas, ‘Emerging Global Actors: The United Nations and National Human
Rights Institutions’, Global Governance 9 (2003), 23–42; Thomas Pegram, ‘Diffusion
Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions’,
Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010), 729–760; Peter Rosenblum, ‘Tainted Origins and
Uncertain Outcomes: Evaluating NHRIs’, in Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, State
Compliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23), 297–323.
33 Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23);
LindaC.Reif, ‘TheShiftingBoundariesofNHRIDeﬁnitionintheInternationalSystem’,
in Goodman/Pegram, Human Rights, State Compliance and Social Change 2012 (n 23),
52–73.
34 Koo/Ramirez, ‘National Incorporation of Global Human Rights’ 2009 (n 24).
35 Ibid.; Pegram, ‘Diffusion Across Political Systems’ 2010 (n 32).
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the few governmental institutions explicitly charged with human rights
promotion and protection, an NHRI is the institution where we would
expect to see the most transparency regarding a State’sh u m a nr i g h t s
practices. Perhaps more importantly, the explicit human rights mandate
ofanNHRIimpliesthatitisthebodytowhichcitizensthemselveswould
ﬁrst look when seeking information about their human rights and the
mechanisms available to ensure their realization. And in fact, the extent
to which an NHRI makes itself accessible to those most vulnerable to
human rights violations has been recognized as a critical element in
evaluating the performance and legitimacy of the institution.
36
Over the past few decades, advances in information and communica-
tion technologies have fundamentally changed how governments pro-
vide information and services to their citizens. The broader global
movement toward e-government
37 suggests that one measure of a
government’s transparency is the amount of information it provides
on itsown websites. And with the dramaticincreaseover the pastdecade
in internet penetration worldwide, one of the primary methods through
which citizens now access information is through the internet, which
many claim has enhanced the power of non-State actors.
38 Admittedly,
improvements in telecommunication infrastructure and e-government
depend considerably on sufﬁcient resources to provide affordable
access. While developed countries would be expected to rely more on
e-government, developing countries have also recognized the centrality
ofinformationtechnologyinfrastructureande-government,particularly
for attracting economic investment.
39 Empirical assessments of levels of
e-government have conﬁrmed that the dissemination of government
information via the internet is not simply a developed country
phenomenon.
40
36 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Performance and Legitimacy 2004
(n 24).
37 Darrell M. West, ‘Global E-Government, 2007’, August 2007, available at: www.inside
politics.org.
38 Ronald Deibert, ‘International Plug’n’Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet, and Global
Public Policy’, International Studies Perspectives 1 (2004), 255–272; Craig Warkentin/
KarenMingst,‘InternationalInstitutions,theStateandGlobalCivilSocietyintheAgeof
the World Wide Web’, Global Governance 6 (2000), 237–257.
39 Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet
Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
40 DarrelM.West,‘E-GovernmentandtheTransformationofServiceDeliveryandCitizen
Attitudes’, Public Administration Review 64 (2004), 15–27; West, ‘Global E-
Government’ 2007 (n 37).
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As of2011, mostNHRIs do have websites (seeTable 10.1).South Asia
has the highest proportion of NHRIs of any region in the world, and all
have working websites. East Asia has the smallest proportion of NHRIs
(slightly less than half of the countries in the region at this point), but
most do have working websites. In absolute numbers, Europe and
central Asia have the largest number of working NHRI websites, with
forty-two. In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, operative NHRI
websites were much less common: fourteen countries with NHRIs had
no web-presence at all, and another ﬁve had web-addresses that led
nowhere.
Table 10.2 is a more systematic effort to analyze the correlates of
transparency as indicated by the existence of a working website. It
presents the ﬁndings of a multivariate logit model, which expresses the
correlation (if any) between various explanatory variables (listed in the
ﬁrstcolumnontheleftofthetable)andwhetheracountryhasaworking
website, a non-functioning web address or no website at all. The poten-
tial correlates we test are proxies for governance arrangements and
capacities, human rights practices, income per capita and internet tech-
nicalcapacity.Theresultsarequitestrongandstriking.Theyarealsojust
as one might expect. Countries that are well and transparently governed
Table 10.1 National Human Rights Institutes (NHRIs) and NHRIs with
Working Websites, by Region
NHRIs Working Websites
Region Number
%c o u n t r i e s
in region Number
%N H R I s
in region
Americas,
Caribbean
25 67.57 21 84.00
East Asia, Paciﬁc 15 48.39 12 80.00
Europe, Central Asia 46 85.19 42 91.30
Middle East, North
Africa
13 61.91 9 69.23
South Asia 7 87.50 7 100.00
Sub-Saharan Africa 34 72.34 15 44.12
Source: Authors’ database, based on accessing each website during
August–September 2011.
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according to a variety of measures are also more likely to have working
NHRI websites. (The sample here covers only those countries with
NHRIs; those without are dropped.) Working NHRI websites are corre-
lated with government effectiveness and rule of law (as measured by the
World Governance Indicators and the World Bank). Note however that
we do not include these variables in the same models because they are
highly correlated (with a Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcient of .88).
Furthermore, countries that were more democratic on average between
2005 and 2010 were much more likely to have NHRIs with working
Table 10.2 NHRIs and Transparency: Correlates of a Working Website
(ordered logit coefﬁcients; probabilities)
M o d e l1 M o d e l2 M o d e l3 M o d e l4 M o d e l5
Government Effectiveness
(2000)
1.105***
(p=.001)
––––
Rule of Law – .964***
(p=.007)
1.59***
(p=.000)
1.16**
(p=.015)
.972**
(p=.042)
Democracy (2005–10
average)
.099**
(p=.024)
.118***
(p=.010)
.159***
(p=.000)
.176***
(p=.000)
.164***
(p=.001)
NHRI age (logged) 1.04*
(p=.075)
1.15**
(p=.05)
1.32**
(p=.011)
1.29**
(p=.017)
1.32**
(p=.017)
Physical integrity index
(2000)
––−.512**
(p=.032)
−.597**
(p=.015)
−.600**
(p=.035)
Income level (World Bank) –––.751**
(p=.015)
.622*
(p=.051)
Internet penetration
in country
––––.026
(p=.420)
Observations 112 112 112 112 112
Pseudo R2 .17 .17 .22 .26 .26
Note:
*=signiﬁcant at .10 level;
**=signiﬁcant at .05 level;
***=signiﬁcant at .01 level.
Dependent variable: 0=no website; 1=web address, but link does not work or does
n o tl ea dt oa no pe ra t i v eN HR Iw e b si t e ;2 = w e ba d dre s sl e a dst oa no pe rat i v eN HR I
website
Source of dependent variable: Authors’ database, based on accessing each website
during August–September 2011.
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websites. The older the NHRI (as measured by the number of years,
logged), the more likely it was to have a working website. Also unsur-
prisingly,NHRIsinwealthiercountriesweremorelikelytohaveworking
NHRI websites. There are, however, two surprising results in this table.
Once we control for other governance factors, it appears to be the case
that the better a countries human rights practices,
41 the less likely it is to
have an NHRI website. This may reﬂect a calculation that good rights
practices make this form of transparency somewhat unnecessary. It is
also surprising that our proxy for technical capacity – average internet
penetration (internet connections per 1000 population) – has practically
no relationship to the existence of a working NHRI website. It seems
more likely that transparency with respect to human rights as measured
by the existence of a website is correlated with governance indicators
rather than technical information technology capacity.
Ofcourseitisnotenoughjusttohaveawebsite.E-governmenthasthe
potential to increase transparency only to the extent that citizens and
international governmental and NGOs are able to access information on
a State’s human rights practices on a timely basis.
42 And a website only
enhances transparency to the extent that it helps a rights holder know
what his or her rights are and how to go about ensuring their realization.
This points to a number of speciﬁc elements we would expect NHRI
websites to provide if they were fully transparent. First, we would expect
an NHRI to help citizens understand their legal rights under interna-
tional and domestic law. Second, a fully transparent NHRI would
present clear and unbiased information on a State’sh u m a nr i g h t sp r a c -
tices,includingnotonlythegoodnewsabouteffortsbeingmade,butalso
the bad news about continuing problems and weaknesses.
43 Third, a
transparent NHRI should provide instructions on how citizens can
submit complaints or communications to domestic or international
treaty bodies, or offer to help in this regard.
41 Human rights practices are measured by the Physical Integrity Index within the
Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project, which summarizes govern-
ment compliance with human rights relating to torture, extrajudicial killing, political
imprisonment and disappearance.
42 Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, ‘E-Government as an Anti-Corruption Strategy’,
Information Economics and Policy 21 (2009), 201–210.
43 While we recognize the importance of accuracy of information provided by NHRIs, our
measures of transparency only capture the amount and to some extent the quality of
information provided, without evaluating accuracy. We believe this constitutes a sufﬁ-
cient ﬁrst step in measuring NHRI transparency.
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4.1 Transparency about the Law
In terms of international human rights, actual NHRI websites display
someinterestingpatterns.Ofthe106NHRIswithworkingwebsites,only
19 make no reference to international law at all. Thirty-two provide a
specialsectiondevotedtoexplaininginternationallegalobligations,with
the remaining ﬁfty-ﬁve making at least some reference to international
law. Surprisingly only nine NHRI websites provide what can be consid-
ereda ‘lay deﬁnition’ of the protections afforded byinternational human
rights law.
In contrast to general references to international human rights, forty-
fourNHRIwebsitesprovidenoindicationofthespeciﬁcconventionsthe
State has ratiﬁed. Of those that do, thirty-four provide a list of ratiﬁed
treaties that appears exhaustive, while twenty-eight mention some rati-
ﬁed treaties but do not provide a systematic list. Fifty-nine NHRI
websites provide no working links to treaty texts, while forty-seven do.
Why are some NHRIs so clear about the nature of international legal
obligations, while others barely mention international human rights
law? One possibility is that NHRIs rely more explicitly on international
legal instruments when domestic legal structures and protections are
weak. However, there appears to be very little evidence for this
‘substitution’ proposition. There is very little difference among countries
that have been stable democracies since World War II (or independ-
ence), countries that have never been democratic, and all others in
various stages and directions of regime transition in this regard. We
created an index (ranging from 0 to 8) that combines the above trans-
parency dimensions to capture the extent to which NHRI websites are
transparent about international legal obligations, but ﬁnd very little
difference on this measure across regime types (see Table 10.3).
By comparison, many more NHRIs focus on domestic human rights
law. Of the 106 NHRIs with working websites, all of them mention
domestic human rights law (statutory or constitutional) though only
47 provide an accessible layperson explanation of these protections.
Eighty NHRIs provide working links to the actual texts of these laws.
Surprisingly, transparency regarding domestic law is not correlated in
any straightforward way with regime type. We created a measure of
domestic legal transparency analogous to the international measure
above, and Table 10.4 shows that there is practically no relationship
betweentheregimetypeofthecountrythatishometotheNHRIandthe
extent to which their website is clear about domestic human rights law.
254 cosette creamer and beth a. simmonsC:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 255 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
T
a
b
l
e
1
0
.
3
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
w
i
t
h
R
e
s
p
e
c
t
t
o
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
H
u
m
a
n
R
i
g
h
t
s
L
a
w
0
(
n
o
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
)
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
7
.
9
1
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
3
.
7
2
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
5
.
2
3
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
2
.
5
4
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
3
.
0
5
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
6
.
1
6
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
7
.
1
7
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
7
.
3
8
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
3
.
5
A
n
d
o
r
r
a
A
n
t
i
g
u
a
&
B
a
r
b
u
d
a
B
e
r
m
u
d
a
B
o
t
s
w
a
n
a
G
r
e
e
n
l
a
n
d
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
I
s
r
a
e
l
M
a
l
t
a
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
N
a
m
i
b
i
a
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
P
a
k
i
s
t
a
n
P
a
p
u
a
N
e
w
G
u
i
n
e
a
B
o
l
i
v
i
a
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
F
i
j
i
H
a
i
t
i
I
n
d
i
a
K
e
n
y
a
K
o
s
o
v
o
M
a
l
d
i
v
e
s
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
N
e
p
a
l
O
m
a
n
P
e
r
u
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
S
o
.
S
u
d
a
n
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
A
l
b
a
n
i
a
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
C
o
s
t
a
R
i
c
a
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
P
a
l
e
s
t
i
n
e
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
T
o
g
o
U
g
a
n
d
a
U
z
b
e
k
i
s
t
a
n
Z
a
m
b
i
a
B
a
n
g
l
a
d
e
s
h
J
o
r
d
a
n
K
a
z
a
k
h
s
t
a
n
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
A
z
e
r
b
a
i
j
a
n
B
o
s
n
i
a
&
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
i
n
a
C
a
n
a
d
a
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
C
y
p
r
u
s
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
o
r
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
H
o
n
d
u
r
a
s
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
M
a
l
a
w
i
A
r
m
e
n
i
a
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
E
g
y
p
t
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
G
u
a
t
e
m
a
l
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
S
e
r
b
i
a
&
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
A
l
g
e
r
i
a
C
a
m
e
r
o
o
n
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
G
r
e
e
c
e
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
M
o
n
g
o
l
i
a
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
N
o
r
w
a
y
P
a
n
a
m
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
A
f
g
h
a
n
i
s
t
a
n
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
C
h
i
l
e
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
K
o
r
e
a
(
S
o
u
t
h
)
M
e
x
i
c
o
N
.
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
U
K
N
e
w
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
K
y
r
g
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
cC:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 256 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
i
c
o
S
a
m
o
a
S
p
a
i
n
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
&
T
o
b
a
g
o
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
P
o
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
N
o
t
e
:
‘
P
o
l
i
t
y
’
r
e
f
e
r
s
t
o
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
p
o
l
i
t
y
s
c
o
r
e
f
r
o
m
2
0
0
5
–
2
0
1
0
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
e
a
c
h
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
.
N
o
t
e
:
t
h
e
0
–
8
s
c
a
l
e
i
s
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
b
y
s
u
m
m
i
n
g
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
s
u
b
-
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
:
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
w
e
b
s
i
t
e
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
a
w
?
(
2
=
y
e
s
,
a
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
c
l
e
a
r
l
y
a
b
o
u
t
I
L
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
;
1
=
s
o
m
e
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
b
u
t
n
o
t
a
d
e
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
;
0
=
n
o
,
n
o
n
e
.
)
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
w
h
i
c
h
i
f
a
n
y
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
h
u
m
a
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
a
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
h
a
s
r
a
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
?
(
2
=
y
e
s
,
a
p
p
e
a
r
s
e
x
h
a
u
s
t
i
v
e
;
1
=
y
e
s
,
s
o
m
e
b
u
t
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
l
i
s
t
a
l
l
s
y
s
t
e
m
a
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
p
o
s
t
o
r
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
l
i
n
k
s
t
o
t
h
e
h
u
m
a
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
t
r
e
a
t
y
t
e
x
t
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
h
a
s
r
a
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
?
(
2
=
y
e
s
,
a
n
d
l
i
n
k
(
s
)
i
s
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
;
1
=
y
e
s
,
b
u
t
l
i
n
k
(
s
)
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
w
o
r
k
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
*
I
f
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
a
w
,
d
o
e
s
i
t
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
a
‘
l
a
y
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
’
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
i
t
s
m
e
a
n
i
n
g
?
(
1
=
y
e
s
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
ﬁ
l
i
n
g
,
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
a
n
d
/
o
r
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
e
g
a
l
c
a
s
e
s
?
(
1
=
y
e
s
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
’
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
e
a
c
h
w
e
b
s
i
t
e
d
u
r
i
n
g
A
u
g
u
s
t
–
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
.C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 257 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
T
a
b
l
e
1
0
.
4
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
w
i
t
h
R
e
s
p
e
c
t
t
o
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
H
u
m
a
n
R
i
g
h
t
s
L
a
w
0
(
n
o
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
)
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
1
0
1
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
8
.
1
2
P
o
l
i
t
y
4
.
2
3
P
o
l
i
t
y
5
.
4
4
P
o
l
i
t
y
:
4
.
4
5
P
o
l
i
t
y
1
.
3
6
(
M
a
x
.
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
)
P
o
l
i
t
y
6
.
8
C
y
p
r
u
s
A
n
d
o
r
r
a
M
o
n
g
o
l
i
a
N
i
c
a
r
a
g
u
a
N
o
r
w
a
y
P
a
p
u
a
N
e
w
G
u
i
n
e
a
S
a
m
o
a
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
S
u
d
a
n
E
t
h
i
o
p
i
a
G
r
e
e
n
l
a
n
d
P
a
l
e
s
t
i
n
e
P
u
e
r
t
o
R
i
c
o
S
e
n
e
g
a
l
A
n
t
i
g
u
a
a
n
d
B
a
r
b
u
d
a
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
C
a
m
e
r
o
o
n
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
s
r
a
e
l
K
a
z
a
k
h
s
t
a
n
M
a
l
a
w
i
M
a
l
t
a
N
e
w
Z
e
a
l
a
n
d
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
A
l
b
a
n
i
a
B
o
t
s
w
a
n
a
F
i
j
i
F
r
a
n
c
e
H
a
i
t
i
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
K
e
n
y
a
K
o
s
o
v
o
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
O
m
a
n
P
a
k
i
s
t
a
n
P
a
n
a
m
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
a
n
d
T
o
b
a
g
o
T
u
n
i
s
i
a
U
z
b
e
k
i
s
t
a
n
Z
a
m
b
i
a
A
f
g
h
a
n
i
s
t
a
n
A
l
g
e
r
i
a
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
A
z
e
r
b
a
i
j
a
n
B
e
r
m
u
d
a
B
o
s
n
i
a
&
H
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
.
C
a
n
a
d
a
C
h
i
l
e
C
o
s
t
a
R
i
c
a
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
E
g
y
p
t
E
l
S
a
l
v
a
d
o
r
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
G
e
o
r
g
i
a
G
r
e
e
c
e
H
o
n
d
u
r
a
s
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
A
r
m
e
n
i
a
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
B
a
n
g
l
a
d
e
s
h
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
B
o
l
i
v
i
a
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
G
u
a
t
e
m
a
l
a
H
o
n
g
K
o
n
g
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
M
a
l
d
i
v
e
s
M
e
x
i
c
o
M
o
l
d
o
v
a
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
,
U
KC:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 258 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
I
n
d
i
a
J
o
r
d
a
n
K
o
r
e
a
(
S
o
u
t
h
)
K
y
r
g
y
z
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
M
a
u
r
i
t
i
u
s
N
a
m
i
b
i
a
N
e
p
a
l
P
a
r
a
g
u
a
y
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
T
a
n
z
a
n
i
a
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
T
o
g
o
P
e
r
u
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
S
e
r
b
i
a
&
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
S
p
a
i
n
S
r
i
L
a
n
k
a
S
w
e
d
e
n
U
g
a
n
d
a
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
l
a
N
o
t
e
:
‘
P
o
l
i
t
y
’
r
e
f
e
r
s
t
o
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
p
o
l
i
t
y
s
c
o
r
e
f
r
o
m
2
0
0
5
–
2
0
1
0
f
o
r
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
e
a
c
h
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
.
N
o
t
e
:
t
h
e
0
–
6
s
c
a
l
e
i
s
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
b
y
s
u
m
m
i
n
g
t
h
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
s
u
b
-
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
:
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
h
u
m
a
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
l
a
w
(
c
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
o
r
s
t
a
t
u
t
o
r
y
)
?
(
1
=
y
e
s
;
0
=
n
o
)
*
I
f
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
l
a
w
,
d
o
e
s
i
t
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
a
‘
l
a
y
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
’
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
i
t
s
m
e
a
n
i
n
g
?
(
1
=
y
e
s
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
w
e
b
s
i
t
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
l
i
n
k
s
t
o
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
l
a
w
s
/
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
o
n
?
(
3
=
y
e
s
,
a
n
d
a
l
l
l
i
n
k
(
s
)
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
;
2
=
y
e
s
,
a
n
d
s
o
m
e
l
i
n
k
s
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
;
1
=
y
e
s
,
b
u
t
l
i
n
k
(
s
)
n
o
t
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
*
D
o
e
s
t
h
e
N
H
R
I
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
ﬁ
l
i
n
g
,
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
a
n
d
/
o
r
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
o
f
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
l
e
g
a
l
c
a
s
e
s
?
(
1
=
y
e
s
;
0
=
n
o
.
)
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
’
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
e
a
c
h
w
e
b
s
i
t
e
d
u
r
i
n
g
A
u
g
u
s
t
–
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
.C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 259 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
A more systematic analysis of the data conﬁrms that the democratic
nature of the regime that is home to the NHRI does not predict a high
degree of transparency with respect to either international or domestic
law. Table 10.5 displays the results of a regression analysis of the corre-
lates of legal transparency. The dependent variables in this table are the
domestic law transparency score, the international law transparency
s c o r e ,t h er a t i oo ft h el a t t e rt ot h ef o r m e r ,a n dt h et o t a l( t h es u mo ft h e
two scores). The average degree of democracy between 2005 and 2010 is
notcorrelated withanyofthese.Similarly,transparencyisnotcorrelated
with a country’s democracy score for 2010, the variance in democratic
governance between 2005 and 2010, or whether a country has been a
stable democracy, in transition or a stable autocracy since World War II.
The two factors that seem most consistently associated with legal
transparencyaretheageoftheNHRIandtheincomelevelofthecountry
in which it is situated. Older NHRIs are much less likely to be trans-
parent about international legal obligations, and legal obligations in
general. The younger the NHRI, the more likely it is to provide clear,
accessible and thorough information about international legal obliga-
tions. Note that there isno relationship between NHRI age and domestic
legal transparency alone, however. Furthermore, the higher the income
level of the country home to the NHRI, the more likely the it is to
thoroughly and transparently discuss human rights law, particularly
international human rights law.
4.2 Transparency about Practices
A key aspect of transparency is that citizens are able to access informa-
tion about their government’s policies, and – even more essential – their
actual practices. In the human rights area, access to information about
the measures governments are taking to improve rights, as well as their
shortcomings,isimportantifcitizensaretoeffectivelyholdtheirgovern-
ment accountable. Since one of the primary purposes of NHRIs is to
promote human rights, transparency should facilitate access to informa-
tion about how well a government implements laws and respects the
rights of its people in practice.
Transparent NHRIs should be willing to post neutral and accurate
reports of their human rights record on their website. But in contrast to
the large number of NHRIs that are reasonably transparent about the
law, few offer performance-based information on their websites. We
found that 92 of the 106 NHRIs with working websites do not mention
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Table 10.5 Correlates of Legal Transparency
Sample: NHRIs with websites
Regression Coefﬁcients (probability)
Domestic
law
transparency
International
law
transparency
Ratio of
international to
domestic
transparency
Total legal
transparency
International
legal
Transparency
.209**
(p=.011)
–– –
Domestic legal
Transparency
– .328**
(p=.011)
––
Income level .442
(p=.102)
−.009
(p=.980)
.005
(p=.963)
.620
(p=.214)
Physical
integrity
index (2009)
−.377***
(p=.003)
−.164
(p=.305)
−.011
(p=.825)
−.751***
(p=.001)
Internet
penetration
.030**
(p=.015)
.005
(p=.808)
−.003
(p=.592)
.049*
(p=.080)
Rule of law −.434
(p=.213)
.662
(p=.129)
.161
(p=.260)
.241
(p=.705)
Average
democracy
level
(2005–2010)
.005
(p=.917)
.031
(p=.487)
−.007
(p=.689)
.048
(p=.577)
Ratiﬁcation of
human rights
treaties
2.60*
(p=.072)
2.20
(p=.226)
.383
(p=.514)
6.56***
(p=.013)
NHRI age (log) .475
(p=.267)
−1.36***
(p=.001)
−.378**
(p=.022)
−1.09
(p=.157)
Number of Obs 101 101 86 101
Adjusted R2 .30 .17 .09 .20
Note:
*=s i g n i ﬁcant at .10 level;
**=s i g n i ﬁcant at .05 level;
***=s i g n i ﬁcant at .01 level.
Sourceofdependentvariables:Authors’ database,basedonaccessingeachwebsite
during August–September 2011. (See notes to Tables 10.2 and 10.3 above.)
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their periodic reports to international human rights bodies. Six men-
tioned these reports, but did not provide working links so that private
citizens could access them. Eight NHRIs do post these reports, and the
links work (Germany, Sweden, France, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand,
Maldives and South Korea). This kind of transparency does seem to be
the special preserve of the most democratic countries: the average polity
scoreforthosethat provided working access to their country reportswas
9.5, while that for those with broken links was signiﬁcantly lower (–2.8).
Countries that do not mention the reports at all had an average
polity score of 4.4. The eight countries that posted country reports are
also the only ones that provide links to the oversight committees’
responses to these reports. And only Northern Ireland, Denmark,
Germany, Sweden, New Zealand and the Maldives post ‘shadow reports’
bynon-governmental groupsthat providean independent assessment of
government policies and practices. Furthermore, only seventeen coun-
tries provide information on international legal challenges to a State’s
human rights practices.
4.3 Transparency about How to Lodge a Violation Complaint
One of the primary reasons transparency is important is that it enhances
the possibility that people will be able to act to protect their rights and
interests.NHRIsarenotonlyvaluableinstitutions forpromotingknowl-
edge about rights and practices, but also for assisting citizens in under-
standing their options if they feel their rights have been somehow
violated. This can include instructions on how to lodge a complaint
with the NHRI or other appropriate national bodies, as well as how to
submit individual communications to international treaty bodies. We
therefore examined all NHRI websites in search of evidence that they
informed citizens of available steps – both domestic and international –
to have the (alleged) violation addressed, considering both legal (judi-
cial) as well as non-legal (mediation, investigation) options. We found
that seventy-one NHRI websites made some mention of steps individu-
alscouldtakeiftheyfelttheirrightshadbeenviolated;thirty-ﬁvegaveno
guidance whatsoever.
It is clear that NHRIs are much more focused on domestic rather than
internationaloptionsforaddressingallegedrightsviolations.Fullysixty-
nine NHRI websites explain (with varying degree of clarity and com-
pleteness) what non-judicial steps individuals can take to have rights’
issues addressed. Another thirty explain what citizens can do to pursue
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their rights through the courts or other legal means. Few NHRIs refer-
enceinternationaloptions,however.OnlythewebsitesofCameroonand
Thailand mention non-legal international options, such as contacting
international NGOs or the UN OHCHR, while only Slovakia’sN H R I
mentions international legal options individuals may pursue on its
website.
No matter how clear an NHRI tries to be in explaining available
options for lodging complaints about rights violations, in many cases
citizens will need further clariﬁcation or seek assistance in this process.
As a ﬁnal test of transparency in pursuing remedies for rights violations,
we e-mailed every NHRI that had an e-mail contact address with the
subject heading ‘rights question’ and the following message from a
Yahoo! domain: ‘[i]f I feel my rights have been violated, how does the
complaint process proceed? [signed] C.s.D’. First and foremost, we
c o d e dw h e t h e rt h eN H R Ia n s w e r e dt h i ss i m p l eb u tv a g u eq u e s t i o n .
Only thirty-three NHRIs answered within two months; sixty-four did
not. Figure 10.2 shows that capacity of the NHRI might explain the
likelihood of receiving an answer: the higher the income category of
the country, the higher the proportion of e-mails sent resulted in some
kind of answer.
Of the thirty-three that responded, seventeen gave a complete and
fairly useful answer. Eight said we should have contacted another person
or ofﬁce; four NHRIs responded with an automatic message of a general
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nature; and eight provided us with a personal but very vague answer. To
our knowledge, none forwarded our message to another destination; nor
did any discourage us from further contact.
5. Is Transparency Correlated with Better Rights Practices?
Our ﬁnal question is whether transparency as measured by the existence
and quality of information to which citizens have access matters for
actual rights practices. Unfortunately our current data do not allow us to
answer this question since we cannot sort out cause and effect. This is
especially the case since all of our explanatory variables relating to
transparency were measured in the summer and autumn of 2011,
while most of the measures available on human rights practices are for
the year 2009 at the latest. On the one hand, we cannot explain some-
thing observed in 2009 with a ‘cause’ observed in 2011. On the other
hand, many of the websites explored in this research have been up and
running for years, and it is at least possible if not likely that some of our
measures of legal transparency were in place well before we collected out
d a t a .I nt h ea b s e n c eo fal o n g e rt i m eseries of data measuring trans-
parency, the most we can do at this point is explore relationships
between changes in practices over the past decade and recent measures
of transparency. We do this by reporting correlations between recent
transparency measures and recent human rights practices, controlling
for practices in 2000. It is also important to admit that even in the best of
circumstances,transparency–andespeciallythefairlynarrowindicators
of transparency we explore in this chapter – is likely to explain only a
small fraction of any variance we see in rights practices over the past
decade. Compounded with quite crude measures of rights practices
themselves, we should not be surprised to see extremely weak correla-
tions between transparency and rights improvements.
This is in fact what we ﬁnd. Table 10.6 reports a series of models that
r e g r e s s2 0 0 9r i g h t sm e a s u r e so nr i g h t sm e a s u r e si n2 0 0 0a n do u rv a r i o u s
measures of transparency.
44 For all of these measures, we found no
evidence of a positive correlation between the mere existence of an
NHRI and a rights improvement. In one case – using a measure of
general ‘empowerment’ that taps into the extent to which citizens are
44 These measures include: the existence of an NHRI; existence of a website; the quality of
legal transparency, reporting on government practices and providing an e-mail answer
advising about ‘what to do if my rights have been violated’.
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empowered vis-à-vis their governments – there is even a negative, albeit
weak, correlation. In two cases involving physical integrity and torture
(which are highly correlated with a Pearson’sc o r r e l a t i o nc o e f ﬁcient of
.81) the presence of a website is associated weakly with improved out-
comes. In the case of torture, legal transparency might be weakly corre-
lated with a slight reduction in torture. NHRIs whose websites post
human rights reports (and responses) and those that answer e-mail
requests for information on what to do about a potential rights violation
are associated with improved workers’ rights. As one might expect, the
World Governance Indicator of ‘voice and accountability’,w h i c hm e a s -
ures perceptions of the extent to which a country protects certain civil
and political rights such as freedom of expression and a free media, is
somewhat higher for NHRIs that bother to answer e-mail inquiries. We
reiterate our caution about these ﬁndings. But they do seem to point to
Table 10.6 Is Transparency Correlated with Better Rights Practices?
Results of OLS regression (‘No’=less that 15% probability that the
estimated coefﬁcient is different than zero).
Physical
Integrity Torture
Workers’
rights
Empowerment
(CIRI)
Voice and
Accountability
(World Bank)
NHRI No No No −.467*
(p=.071)
No
Given an
NHRI:
website
.225*
(p=.070)
.084
(p=.124)
No No No
Given NHRI
website:
Legal
transparency
No .011
(p=.144)
No No No
Given NHRI
website:
reporting
No No .052
(p=.129)
.187
(p=.142)
No
Given NHRI
website:
answering
No No .220*
(p=.055)
No .119
(p=.109)
Note: all models include a control for the rights practice in 2000.
264 cosette creamer and beth a. simmonsC:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 265 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM
the possibility that NHRIs alone are not enough. While it may be
marginally useful to encourage transparency by explaining the law, by
reporting on government practices, and by responding to requests for
information about options in the case of possible violation, this type of
human rights transparency may not be sufﬁcient in and of itself to bring
about short-term improvements in human rights practices. Future
research should monitor the extent of transparency offered by NHRIs,
to track whether in fact these weak results can be fortiﬁed over time.
6. Conclusion
Notably, most countries have now established some type of a national
human rights institution, and a large proportion of these NHRIs employ
websites to disseminate human rights information. This in itself is
striking, and in this respect NHRIs have followed the general trend
toward e-government adopted by many regulatory and other govern-
mental agencies. And as with other forms of e-government, wealthier
and more democratic countries with a strong rule of law or high quality
civil service agencies are more likely to set up an NHRI website.
Intuitively we might also expect countries with more internet users to
expend more resources and effort in setting up government websites and
providing more information on these sites, but we ﬁnd this is only partly
the case for NHRIs. Internet penetration of a country is not associated
with the existence of an NHRI website, although countries with a higher
percentageofinternetusersdotendtohaveNHRIwebsitesthataremore
transparent, particularly with respect to domestic human rights law.
While there seems to be a clear pattern in the setting up of NHRI
websites, the quality and accessibility of these websites vary tremen-
dously. NHRIs display signiﬁcant differences in both the level and type
of human rights transparency found on their websites. In contrast to the
‘isomorphism’ in NHRI structures identiﬁed by some studies, there
appears to be no analogous ‘isomorphism’ with respect to NHRI web-
sites. Governments may decide to establish an NHRI for any number of
reasons, and the powers and independence given to an NHRI (and thus
the extent to which it is permitted to be transparent) are often related to
the original motive or purpose for supporting its initial creation. We
b e l i e v ei tl i k e l yt h a to n l yS t a t e sa lready committed to improving their
human rights practices will support greater NHRI transparency. And in
fact, countries with better human rights practices that have ratiﬁed more
international human rights conventions are slightly more likely to have
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NHRIs which provide greater legal transparency on their websites.
Interestingly though, democratic governance per se does not seem to
be related to the quality and accessibility of these websites. Additionally,
we recognize that in some contexts NHRIs may be subject to signiﬁcant
government pressure to dissuade criticism of its practices, and thus a
measure of NHRI independence from the government might well be an
important factor in explaining the extent to which it is able to be trans-
parent. One useful avenue for further research would be to examine this
relationship between NHRI independence and transparency.
As mentioned earlier, the UN OHCHR and other international and
regional organizations have been at the forefront of the recent push for
NHRI creation worldwide, largely because of the belief that these insti-
tutions are key to ensuring domestic implementation and promotion of
international human rights obligations. Yet, as demonstrated above, a
relatively small proportion of these institutions actually reference or
provide information about international human rights obligations and
processes.Whilethismightbeabitdisappointing,itis notablethatthose
NHRIs that do rate high on international human rights transparency are
institutions that have been established more recently. One possible
reason that newly-established NHRIs are more likely to highlight inter-
national human rights is the fact that they may have been created in
response to recent pressure from the UN OHCHR and other interna-
tional bodies, who might be expected to emphasize these international
obligations.
While greater transparency by an NHRI of a government’sh u m a n
rights practices may be desirable in and of itself, the more interesting
question is whether NHRI transparency affects government compliance
with a State’s human rights obligations. If, as advocates of transparency
argue, transparency improves governance by providing disenfranchised
citizens and groups with more information to push for political change,
then we would expect increased human rights transparency to provide
civil society with more information around which to organize and
mobilize, providing leverage to increase pressure on governments.
Greater transparency would thus e n c o u r a g em o r eo r g a n i z a t i o na n d
mobilization by civil society groups, who use this information to put
pressure on the government to change its human rights practices. At this
time,itisimpossibletoempiricallyassessthiscausalargument,butaswe
have shown NHRI transparency is only weakly correlated with human
rightsimprovementsoverthepast decade. We suspectthispartlymaybe
b e c a u s et h ee x i s t e n c eo fa nN H R I– even one that provides high quality
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and accessible information about human rights law, practices and
remedies – is not enough to guarantee short-term improvements in
actual rights practices. While this type of transparency may be margin-
ally useful and inherently desirable, its utility in changing government
practicesmayalsodependonanumberofotherfactors,suchastime,the
presence of a strong civil society, a free press, or other political and civil
liberties. Future research should continue to monitor the extent of trans-
parency offered by NHRIs, to track whether in fact such transparency
helps bring about longer-term improvements in human rights.
transparency of human rights institutions 267C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/4121465/WORKINGFOLDER/BIHI/9781107021389C10.3D 268 [239–268] 4.6.2013 6:27PM